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Introduction
Alongside electricity generation, the transport sector constitutes the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the industrialized world. In 2005, this sector was responsible for 20% of CO2 emissions in the European Union (EEA 2007:64) , roughly three fifths of which can be attributed to private automobiles (COM 2007b:2) . While emissions have decreased in sectors such as industry and agriculture, both dropping by 11% between 1990 and 2005, road traffic is one of the few sectors in the EU-15 1 in which emissions have increased, rising by 26% over the same period (EEA 2007:65) .
This trend threatens to thwart efforts to achieve the targets of the Kyoto Protocol, under which the EU is to reduce greenhouse gases by 8% relative to the 1990 level by 2012 2 .
Against this backdrop, the European Commission (hereafter Commission) is currently considering a new directive to reduce the per-kilometer CO2 discharge of newly registered automobiles. The proposed directive, which is based on legally codified targets, is motivated by two principal considerations. The first is that the transport sector has thus far not been integrated into the EU's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which commenced operation in 2005 as the largest multi-country certificate trading scheme worldwide. Secondly, it is now a foregone conclusion that the voluntary commitment of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) to reduce average emissions to 140g CO2/km by 2008, negotiated with the Commission in 1998, will not be met.
To maintain climate protection policy on track, the Commission published in December 2007 a proposal for reducing the CO2 emissions from private automobiles that would set maximum allowable emissions for 2012 depending on the mass of the vehicle. The core of the proposal is a so-called limit value curve relating the vehicle 5 mass to a corresponding CO2 emission limit, which is set in such a way that a fleetaverage of 130 grams of CO2 per kilometer is achieved. A key implication following from this curve is that the emission reduction required of heavy vehicles is disproportionately higher than that of light vehicles. Despite the proposal's attempt to consider vehicle mass, it has been met with vigorous opposition, particularly from Germany.
In this paper, we explore the basis for the Commission's proposal from both an economic and technological angle. The following section begins with an overview of the proposal's background and terms, subsequently focusing on its economic implications for the highly differentiated automobile market as well as on its costeffectiveness in reducing emissions relative to other instruments, such as emissions trading. Section 3 scrutinizes key assumptions underpinning the proposal, finding that these misrepresent the current state of automotive technology and therefore may overestimate the feasibility of achieving the suggested emissions targets. In Section 4, alternative reduction targets are consequently proposed that are argued to more accurately reflect the industry's technological evolution to date. Section 5 concludes.
The Commission's Proposal and its Economic Valuation
In recognition of the accumulating scientific evidence on global warming, the Commission has for several years taken an offensive posture in formulating policies that aim at mitigating the role of human agency in climate change (COM 2007a). The stabilization and, ultimately, reduction of greenhouse gases in the EU is regarded to be a cornerstone of this effort. By 2004, however, greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-15 decreased by only 1.5% relative to the base year of 1990, a modest achievement relative to the Kyoto target of an 8% reduction by 2012 (EEA 2007:24) . Much is consequently riding on the success of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in realizing this goal. This instrument was introduced in 2005 as a centerpiece of climate policy, and is considered in the environmental economics literature to be an economically efficient means of effectively reducing emissions (Baumol, Oates 1971:47) .
Among the participants of the ETS are electricity producers and the most energyintensive industry branches. Road transport is not included. Rather than pursuing the integration of this sector, as is planned for air traffic, the Commission is submitting a legislative proposal for reducing the CO2 emissions of private automobiles. This proposal falls under a more general strategy for the reduction of CO2 emissions from road traffic, which is based on three pillars: (i) voluntary commitments of the associations of European, Japanese, and Korean auto manufacturers, (ii) guidelines on labeling and the provision of information to consumers, and (iii) tax measures that favor vehicles that have light fuel requirements. After reviewing the strategy in 2007, the Commission concluded that without additional policy measures, the goal of reaching the level of 120g CO2/km by 2012 could not be reached (COM 2007a:8) . The prevailing view is that these three pillars should now be complemented by legislative limits on CO2 emissions from newly registered vehicles, which are to be enforced with the threat of penalty payments for non-compliance (COM 2007b:21) .
In December 2007, the Commission published a draft of a new directive that allows per-kilometer CO2 discharges to increase with the mass of vehicles (COM 207b:26) .
The core of this draft is a so-called limit value curve, whose slope is such that manufacturers of heavier vehicles, which arguably also tend to be safer and more comfortable than lighter vehicles, must achieve higher percentage reductions in emissions than manufacturers of lighter vehicles. The limit value curve is given by the following linear equation:
where M is the vehicle mass in kilograms and ECO2 are the allowed per-km emissions.
According to Equation (1), the CO2 discharge of a new car with a mass of 1,289 kg, which is nearly identical to the current sales-weighted average of 1.288.8 kg (COM 2007 c:5) , must be reduced to 130 g CO2/km by 2012.
A convincing justification for the shape of this curve, reproduced in Figure 1 , has regrettably been absent from the Commission's public communications. In particular, the slope of 0.0457 of the limit value cure is a critical parameter that inexplicably remains completely unmotivated and seemingly arbitrary. Indeed, whether the proposed limit value curve reflects the future state of technological development and thereby the most cost-effective means of reaching the emission targets remains an open question of immediate relevance from a public welfare perspective. (----) the Commission's reference line: ECO2 = 162,8 + 0,095 (M -1.289) (-----) the limit value curve: ECO2 = 130 + 0,0457 (M -1.289)
Of equal relevance are the likely market impacts. It is reasonable to assume that the proposed limits on per-km emissions will have varying effects on the highly differentiated market segments of the automobile industry, so that the competitive position of individual manufacturers will necessarily change relative to the current market equilibrium. Manufacturers situated in market segments in which the specified emissions are relatively difficult to attain will incur higher compliance costs than other manufacturers, and these increases will tend to be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. This transfer of higher costs will not occur without undermining the manufacturer's competitiveness, however, because the demand for its own vehicles will not least depend on the prices of other vehicles in the same market segment. 3 In contrast to the transfer of costs that are borne by all manufacturers, the directive is likely to result in a shift in demand away from those manufacturers that incur a relatively high increase in costs. To craft a directive that did not influence the competitive situation of the individual manufacturers in such a highly interdependent market would require close consideration of the technical possibilities for emissions reductions as well as the market structure. Such an analysis, however, is not recognizable in this case.
Based on a reading of the Commission's public documents, the working assumption seems to be that the measure will induce considerable incentives for the development of fuel-saving technologies, as non-compliance with the allowable emissions will it would discharge 41g/km more CO2 than would be allowed according to the limit value curve, thereby requiring that the manufacturer pay a fine of 820 € to the Commission with the sale of each car. By 2014, a fine of 2,460 € would be due, increasing to 3,895 € by 2015. It is reasonable to conclude that the cost increases resulting from either these fines or from the technological investments to avoid them would at least partially be passed onto consumers.
The CO2 abatement costs that emerge from this penalty structure are substantial. For example, given a total of 100,000 kilometers driven over the life of the automobile, This increase can at least be partially attributed to the so-called rebound effect, a behavioral response to more efficient technology whose impact typically receives short shrift in the analysis of efficiency standards. In the case of automobiles, the rebound effect refers to the tendency to drive more when the per kilometer costs of driving is decreased through increased efficiency. A report from the United Kingdom's Energy Research Centre concludes that if rebound effects are ignored, the contribution that energy efficiency makes to reducing carbon emissions will be overestimated (Sorrell 2007 ). This conclusion is bolstered by a recent econometric analysis of car-owning households in Germany (Frondel, Peters, Vance 2007) , which finds that up to 60% of the potential greenhouse gas savings from improved efficiency could be lost to more driving from the lower per-kilometer costs of vehicle usage.
The State of Technology and its Progress
Irrespective of these economic considerations, there still remains the question of how the limit value curve was conceived. Ideally, it would represent the lowest per-km emissions achievable given the future state of technology. Assuming that this ideal limit value curve could be determined precisely, this foundation would provide for a compelling argument for the obligatory compliance with this upper bound, both for the public and the manufacturers. After all, those at the technological vanguard would be saddled with relatively lighter emission reduction obligations and would thereby incur lower costs than the stragglers.
Since such an ideal limit value curve refers to both the current state of technology and future technological developments, it is, of course, not directly observable. Yet, it could be substituted by referring to an estimate based on the current state of technology. As suggested by the Commission's publications (COM 2007c:4), such an estimate is represented by the reference line in Figure 1 . Depending on expectations concerning the pace of technological development, the future requirements could then be defined by referring to this line in order to approach the desired average target. For example, one could set the compulsive targets at a uniform absolute reduction with regard to this reference line, irrespective of vehicle mass.
Consequentially, the limit value curve would lie parallel to the reference line such that the targeted average of 130 g CO2/km would just be achieved.
By ascribing the limit value curve a much smaller slope than the reference line displayed in Figure 1 , however, manufacturers of heavier vehicles must contend with higher reduction liabilities ȭ even in percentage terms ȭ than their competitors producing lighter vehicles. This relation, according to which future compulsory reduction liabilities disproportionately increase with the mass of the vehicle, is shown in the last two columns of Table 1 . Presumably, the assumption underlying the limit value curve (1) is that manufacturers of vehicles with higher masses and engine power have correspondingly higher potential for achieving cost-efficient reductions in emissions relative to the current state. Although this may well be true, it would nevertheless be desirable to provide convincing evidence to buttress this assumption.
Even more disconcerting, though, is the fact that the reference line put forward by the Commission (COM 2007c:4) does not accurately reflect the current state of technology, as a closer look at Figure 1 reveals. Although a clear explanation of how the line was estimated is lacking, it can be readily shown that its slope of roughly 9.5 g CO2/km for each 100 kilograms of vehicle mass is based on a linear regression that excludes the average values for both Subaru (1384 kg and 216 g CO2/km) and Porsche (1596 kg and 282 g CO2/km). As both manufacturers produce vehicles that are among those with the highest average masses, their inclusion in the estimated regression would result in a substantial increase of the slope to 21.6 g CO2/km for each 100 kg vehicle mass, over double that of the Commission's reference line ( Figure   2 ). Ignoring this data in the calculation not only fails to reflect the technological status quo, but also implies that both manufacturers have neglected opportunities to reduce emissions given current technologies, a rather serious accusation for which no justification is provided. By taking into account the technological advancements that have been achieved to date, the proposal's allocation given by the limit value curve has far-reaching and acute consequences: While the actual reference line indicates a current increase of the per-km emissions of roughly 21.6 g CO2/km for each additional 100 kilograms of mass, the limit value curve indicates a considerably smaller increase of roughly 4.6 g CO2/km for each 100 kilograms. It is only such a comparison that clearly reveals the high requirements on manufacturers of large vehicles that are imposed by the Commission's proposal.
In sum, the Commission's plan implies ambitious reductions of per-km emissions for manufacturers of cars with higher masses. In particular, BMW and Daimler-Chrysler must contend with liabilities of up to nearly 25 %, whereas French and Italian manufacturers are in a relatively favourable position, with future reduction liabilities ranging between 11 % and 15 %. In light of potential effects on the competitive positions of the individual manufacturers, the emerging criticism of the Commission's proposal from the German public as well as from the German Federal Government appears to be understandable. In this regard, it bears emphasizing that even a uniform proportional liability of 20 % for all manufacturers would lead to higher absolute reduction liabilities for producers of vehicles with higher masses compared to their lower-mass competitors. In the case of BMW, for example, the required reduction would be 36 g CO2/km, compared with less than 30 g CO2/km for Fiat. Alternative (i) takes the reference line published by the Commission -with its slope of 9.5 g CO2/km for each additional 100 kg -as a reference and binds the manufacturers to a proportional reduction of 20.2% instead of the disproportionate reduction given by the limit value curve. Manufacturers of vehicles with lower masses would consequently have a slightly higher burden than that suggested by the Commission. As an example, Fiat would be obliged to reduce their per-km emissions by 19 % instead of 15.3 % ( Table 2) . This alternative's moderately higher burden for manufacturers of lower-mass vehicles is formally shown by the associated new target line (Figure 3 ), whose slope of 0.0759 is significantly higher than the limit value curve's slope of 0.0457.
As with alternative (i), alternative (ii) would maintain the Commission's reference line -despite its questionable illustration of the current state of technology -but drop the line in parallel so as to comply with the average target of 130 g CO2/km.
Manufacturers of smaller cars with per-km emissions located on the Commission's reference line would consequently have to achieve higher percentage reductions than their heavier competitors located further along the line. Accusations of unfairness could be rebutted by pointing out that this line's slope of 9.5 g CO2/km for each 100 kilograms is, in any case, not representative of the true relation between vehicle mass and specific CO2 emissions. With particular regard to the reduction requirements of the German manufacturers, alternative (ii) would recognize their technological competence in combining car performance and environmental sustainability. For example, BMW would be obliged to reduce their emissions by 36 instead of 45 g CO2/km (Table 3 ). Similar to alternative (i), finally, alternative (ii) also has the virtue of rewarding low-emission manufacturers with modest reduction targets, while it simultaneously punishes the stragglers with ambitious targets. The third alternative would refer the actual reference line from Figure 2 , with its slope of 21.6 g CO2/km for each 100 kilograms, and introduce a proportional reduction of 23.2 %. Note that with respect to the actual reference line, Volkswagen, BMW, and Daimler-Chrysler emerge at the technological vanguard. They would consequently contend with a lighter emission reduction burden than that embodied in the Commission proposal. Fiat, by contrast, would be penalized for its relatively high emissions given its low mass ( Figure 5 ). In particular, Fiat would have to reduce their per-km emissions by some 44 g CO2/km, roughly twice the amount suggested by the Commission proposal (Table   3 ). In contrast, the reduction liabilities of BMW and Daimler shrink by almost half.
Nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that, in absolute terms, the technological pioneers and manufacturers of low-mass vehicles still have a lighter burden than the technological laggards and manufacturers of high-mass vehicles. Indeed, all three alternatives share the imposition of a high reduction burden for Porsche, the evident "ecological black sheep" with respect to emissions. 
Summary and Conclusion
It is perhaps no surprise that those most adversely affected by a political intervention are often the loudest critics. Nevertheless, the analysis undertaken in this paper suggests that the resistance met by the Commission's proposal to limit per-km CO2 emissions, particularly in Germany, has merit and thus deserves consideration as the legislative process continues. Although one might expect that the basic concept underlying the proposal is well-founded, particularly given the extensive economic reverberations that are likely to follow, the logic underpinning the details of its implementation remains opaque. This lack of transparency applies especially to the cornerstone of the proposal, the so-called limit value curve, which relates future per-km CO2 emissions to the vehicle mass, leaving the outsider with the impression that it was set arbitrarily.
A similar impression is unfortunately conveyed by the Commission's questionable depiction of the current state of technology, which completely ignores the influence of two manufacturers, Porsche and Subaru. We argue that any given curve specifying future allowable emissions must be based on both the correctly determined current state of technology and the expected technological progress. Since an accurate anticipation of the technological progress remains difficult, we used the Commission's proposal as a basis for developing three alternative curves ensuring that the target of 130 g CO2/km by 2012 is achieved while simultaneously allocating the reduction burdens to the various car manufacturers in different ways. Our primary concern was in providing justifications for the alternative allocation methods.
Given the high CO2 abatement cost linked to the Commission's proposal as well as the principal difficulties in determining and incorporating technological progress into per-km emissions targets, the question arises as to whether policy should instead be aimed at absolute reductions of emissions, which is, ultimately, what climate protection is about. The integration of road traffic into the Emissions Trading Scheme affords one promising alternative. Another promising option would be to harmonize and gradually increase petroleum taxation across Europe. In contrast to its standing in the Commission's proposal, this is an area in which Germany clearly stands out as one of Europe's leaders, with a fuel taxation rate second only to the United Kingdom's. With respect to per-km emissions, by contrast, this paper has shown that the identification of leaders and laggards is less evident, and may consequently be subject to highly contentious and ultimately counterproductive politicking.
